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Department of Philosophy, Smith College; Harvard Divinity School;
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne;
Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies
jgarﬁeld@smith.edu

In Tibetan discussions of the two truths—and in particular in Geluk
discussions, inﬂected as they are by both Dharmakīrti’s and Candrakīrti’s
epistemologies, which, however different they are, agree on the necessity
of epistemic warrant for genuine knowledge, and on the appropriateness of
particular epistemic warrants or instruments to their respective objects of
knowledge—the nature of our knowledge of the ultimate truth leads to
interesting epistemological and ontological problems. Given that the ultimate
truth must be a possible object of knowledge, there must be a pramān. a by
means of which it is known. But only buddhas or bodhisattvas on the path of
seeing or above are capable of directly perceiving the ultimate truth. So, for
the rest of us, our knowledge of the ultimate is conceptual, and hence
mediated by rjes dpag (anumān. a) and so must be conceptual in nature. But
the ultimate transcends all concepts, conceptions, and signs. And so it would
appear that we can know nothing about it. But that would suggest that we
can’t even know this, or that there are two truths to be known, including one
about which we can know nothing, not even this . . . .
Moreover, the idea that ordinary beings and lower-level bodhisattvas
cannot know emptiness at all would wreak havoc on Geluk understandings
of lam rim, and of the role of study on the path, according to which our
ability to verify our apparent perception of the ultimate depends upon the
concordance of the object of direct perception in meditative equipoise with
the understanding achieved in conceptual meditation and in subsequent
realization (bcad shes). This raises important questions: Is the object of
inferential insight into the ultimate the ultimate truth itself, or merely some
surrogate? If it is the ultimate, since the ultimate realized by buddhas and by
bodhisattvas in advanced meditative equipoise transcends all conception but
can in some sense be known conceptually, are there two ultimates or one?
If two, what is their relationship to each other? If conceptual realization
grasps only a surrogate, given that that surrogate is deceptive, is it
knowledge at all? And if so, in what sense?
The rubric through which these questions are addressed by Geluk
scholars and their interlocutors (such as Gorampa Sonam Sengye and
Taktshang Loden Sherab) relies on the distinction between the don dam
rnam grangs ma yin pa and the don dam rnam pa (sometimes rnam grangs
ma yin pa’i don dam and rnam grangs pa’i don dam) or the uncategorized
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versus categorized ultimate (sometimes translated as the non-nominal versus
nominal ultimate or as the conceptualized versus nonconceptualized
ultimate, or as the ﬁgurative or metaphorical ultimate versus the genuine or
literal ultimate).
As this set of pairs of terms indicates, it is hard to ﬁnd a precise English
translation for rnam grangs in this context. But the family of options on
which various translators have settled helps us to ﬁx on the relevant
semantic range. The general idea is this: the categorized is that which is
apprehended conceptually, that which is seen in terms of sets of distinctions,
or, as we might put it in the language of Sellarsian epistemology, that which
is seen-as;1 the uncategorized is that which is apprehended in the absence
of the drawing of distinctions, the applications of concepts, or that which is
merely seen, not seen as anything, not verbalized. In this discussion, I will
consistently use categorized and uncategorized ultimate to translate rnam
grangs pa’i don dam and rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam, respectively,
unless in direct quotation from scholars using alternative vocabulary.2
Here I explore the resources that this distinction and the accounts
grounded thereon provide for an understanding of the distinction between
conceptual and nonconceptual knowledge of ultimate truth and for an
account of ultimate truth and its role in epistemology more generally. I will
begin with an exploration of the Geluk position as developed by
Tsongkhapa and his commentators, and will then consider responses to that
position by Mipham Rinpoche and Bötrül from the Nyingma perspective. I
will conclude with some reﬂections on what we learn from this literature
about rival Tibetan understandings of the relation between conceptual and
nonconceptual knowledge.
The topic is of interest not only because it occupies so much of the
attention of so many of Tibet’s most eminent philosophers, but because it
focuses on questions about the relation between the conceptual and the
nonconceptual in the context of the most important and most recondite kind
of knowledge recognized in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, knowledge of the
ultimate enabled by ultimate pramān. as (that is, epistemic instruments capable
of giving access to ultimate truth). It therefore raises questions about the role of
direct perception and conceptual understanding in realization. We will see
that the examination of these issues gives us more reason to believe that
paradoxical understandings of the ultimate are the most rational understandings, and the only way to avoid a dismal mysticism about ultimate reality.
I. The Geluk Position
Tsongkhapa argues (1998, 2002, 2006) for a particularly strong understanding of the identity of the two truths, and therefore for a particularly intimate
connection between knowledge of the ultimate and knowledge of the
conventional, namely that to understand the ultimate is to understand
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dependent origination, and hence to understand the conventional. He takes
the basis of division of the two truths to be objects of knowledge: to know
the conventional truth is to know dependently originated phenomena; to
know the ultimate truth is to know the emptiness of those phenomena.
While conventional and ultimate phenomena are not different phenomena
extensionally, they are, in this view, different intensionally, just as Hesperus
and Phosphorus are extensionally, but not intensionally identical.3
In the special insight (lhag mthong) section of Great Exposition of the
Stages of the Path to Awakening (Lam rim chen mo), Tsongkhapa argues that
the basis of division of the categorized versus the uncategorized ultimate is
not objects of knowledge, but kinds of cognitive state (blo). That is, the two
truths are divided based on objects of knowledge, with the conventional
comprising dependently arisen phenomena, and the ultimate comprising the
emptiness of those phenomena, regardless of the nature of the cognitive
state or status of the subject apprehending them. In the case of the
distinction between the categorized and uncategorized ultimate, he argues,
we are distinguishing not between two distinct objects of knowledge (shes
bya), but between two distinct modes of subjectivity in reference to a single
object, namely emptiness, the ultimate truth. Tsongkhapa is adamant that
there is a single ultimate in the objective sense,4 although there are two
distinct modes of apprehension, one conceptual and one nonconceptual,
and that the latter is the goal. Nonetheless, it is crucial to his framework that
each is served by pramān. a, and that each constitutes genuine, nondeceptive
insight into ultimate truth. In the Lam rim chen mo, referring directly to
Bhāviveka’s distinction, he says:
Commenting on this, in his Blaze of Reasons [Bhāviveka] says:
[ultimate] means that which is concordant with (mthun pa) the ultimate.
Because that ultimate exists for a wisdom that is concordant with direct
knowledge of the ultimate, it is said to be concordant with the ultimate.
When we say that something “does not exist ultimately” or “is “nonexistent
ultimately,” it has [this meaning], because that same text says:
Qualm: The ultimate is beyond all awarenesses, but the refutation of an
essence of things is in the realm of letters. Thus, would not the refutation be
nonexistent for that reason?
Reply: There are two types of ultimate. One of these operates without
conceptual activity; it is supramundane, stainless, and without elaborations.
The second operates with conceptual activity and is concordant with the
collections of merit and wisdom[;] it is called “sublime wisdom in the world”
and it does involve elaborations. Here we hold this latter to be the qualiﬁer
in the thesis, “does not exist ultimately,” and so there is no fallacy.
Take this as referring to wisdom based on study and reﬂection that properly
analyzes reality and to consciousnesses above that; it does not refer only to a
noble being’s post-equipoise condition. (Tsongkhapa 2002, vol. III, p. 221)
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Bhāviveka, using the language of concordance (mthun pa) to refer to the
categorized ultimate, suggests, at least on Tsongkhapa’s reading, that the
two kinds of apprehension of ultimate truth agree with respect to their
object. The distinction between them must then be on the subjective side.
And so, Bhāviveka continues (with Tsongkhapa’s agreement) by explaining
that when explicit claims are made about the ultimate, one is engaging with
the categorized ultimate; when one engages nonconceptually, one engages
with the uncategorized ultimate. Since these two kinds of apprehension
engage with the same object, there is nothing wrong with understanding the
claims made about the categorized ultimate to be true of the uncategorized
ultimate, although it cannot be apprehended in terms of those claims or the
concepts they implicate.
In Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa draws this distinction explicitly in
the context of the discussion of the nature of ultimate truth in the
commentary on XXIV:8 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā:
According to other treatises, the ultimate is twofold: the primary [noncategorized] ultimate truth and the secondary [categorized] ultimate truth. For
instance the Satyadvaya-vibhāga says,
Since the refutation of such things as arising
Is consistent with reality,
We assert that it is ultimate.

And the Madhyamakāloka says:
Since non-arising is consistent with the ultimate, it is called “ultimate.” But it
is not actual [yang dag]. The actual is that ultimate which is free from all
fabrication. Here “fabrication” refers not only to the fabrication that is the object
of negation through reasoning but also to the fabrication of appearance. The
freedom from fabrication of appearance is the vanishing of all fabrication of
dualistic appearances in the perspective of one directly perceiving reality . . . .
(p. 494)

Here Tsongkhapa emphasizes both the fact that conceptual understandings
of the ultimate, such as those deriving from Prasāṅgika arguments, are
understandings of the ultimate itself, and not of something else, and that the
actual ultimate—that is, the actual realization of the ultimate—is a realization free from fabrication, including the fabrication of subject-object duality,
but also the fabrication of appearance, that is, the imputation of conceptual
categories to the object of perception. Once again, we have a single object,
but two distinct modes of apprehension of it; each is correct, but one is
more salutary than the other.
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The challenge to this framework is twofold: ﬁrst, we require an account
of what it is to apprehend and to know without the application of
conceptual categories; second, we require an account of the correctness of
conceptual apprehension despite its implication in fabrication. We will see
that it is the latter issue that preoccupies Tsongkhapa’s critics. Tsongkhapa
then turns to the relation between the categorized ultimate and conventional
truth, emphasizing that while they are distinct with respect to their objects,
they are intimately related:
However, in the case of the emptiness that is the negation—that is, the internal
negation—of the ultimate arising of the person and the aggregates, the bases of
emptiness must appear to conventional authoritative cognition, such as a visual
consciousness that sees things directly. Therefore, it appears to a dualistic
appearance from the perspective of the cognizing mind that sees it directly, but
does not appear without dualistic appearance. Therefore, it is a secondary
ultimate, but is a genuine conventional truth . . . .
Through this argument, one should understand that the objects perceived
through the wisdom through which the Buddha perceives empirical phenomena
and the object posited through the wisdom of the other āryas in the postmeditative state, which are perceived through internal negation as illusion-like,
are also secondary (categorized) ultimates. (Tsongkhapa 2006, pp. 495–496)

The point here is that when one perceives emptiness as the categorized
(secondary) ultimate, one perceives it as the emptiness of conventional
phenomena. That requires that conventional phenomena be apprehended by
conventional authoritative cognition (pramān. a); as their emptiness and their
dependently originated status are one and the same, their emptiness appears
to the same conventional authoritative cognition.
While that might appear to be inconsistent with Tsongkhapa’s commitment to the division of the two truths on the basis of knowledge, and the
commitment to conventional pramān. as for conventional phenomena and
ultimate pramān. as for ultimate phenomena, it is not. The ontological union
of the two truths entails that ultimate truth is in an important sense identical
to the conventional. Moreover, Tsongkhapa asserts that the secondary—or
categorized ultimate—is also genuine conventional truth; the uncategorized,
he maintains, transcends all convention.
But this entails neither that the uncategorized and the categorized
ultimates are extensionally distinct nor that the uncategorized ultimate is not
in any sense identical to the conventional. This is because he also argues
that even the uncategorized ultimate is identical to the conventional
extensionally (ngo po gcig), although distinct intensionally (ldog pa tha dad).
This preserves the two bases of division—objects of knowledge for the two
truths and subjects for the two classiﬁcations of the ultimate—while
preserving the identity of the two truths. The distinction is epistemological
while the identity is ontological. The categorized ultimate is the bridge: it is
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identical in object with, but subjectively distinct from, the uncategorized
ultimate; and it is subjectively identical with, but distinct in object from, the
genuine conventional truth.
Tsongkhapa explains this idea further in Illumination of Candrakīrti’s
Thought (dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal). Here he is commenting on
Candrakīrti’s analogy of ﬂoaters in the visual ﬁeld of someone afﬂicted by
opthalmia with conventional truth, and the absence of the ﬂoaters (falling
hairs in the Sanskrit and Tibetan tradition) as analogous to the emptiness of
intrinsic nature:
[Candrakīrti’s use of the opthalmia analogy indicates] only the listener’s failure
to realize exactly what is explained; it does not rule out the listener’s
conceptual realization of the nonexistence of hair.
Although the explanation of ultimate truth through an analogy does not lead to
its realization in the way ultimate truth is seen by those free from the afﬂiction
of the cloud of ignorance, this does not mean that Candrakīrti accepts reality as
non-realizable in a general sense. Ultimate truth is not ineffable, for deﬁnite
scriptural texts and their verbal descriptions do embody its profound meanings.
Furthermore it is not the case that ultimate truth is unrealizable by the mind
associating with verbal descriptions. Therefore every single statement explaining
the meaning of reality as beyond the scope of consciousness and verbal
description must be understood in the same light. (Tsongkhapa 1998, pp.
198–199; translated in Thakchöe 2007, pp. 84–85)

This is a very helpful passage for understanding Tsongkhapa’s insistence that
the categorized ultimate must be taken seriously as ultimate truth. Suppose I
suffer from the relevant opthalmia and go to see the doctor. When my
ophthalmologist explains to me that there really are no falling hairs in the
air around me, and that I am simply suffering from an illusion due to injury
to my retina, I both come to know that there are no such hairs and fail to
stop seeing them. Only after the surgery (I hope) will I stop seeing them
altogether. But the transformation effected by the surgery is a transformation
of my subjectivity, not of my cognitive attitude toward the relevant object of
knowledge (the absence of hairs). I already knew that there are no hairs,
otherwise I would not seek treatment; only later did I come to see the world
without hairs.
It follows, Tsongkhapa argues, that, when she said that it was my retina,
not the environment, that was the problem, she spoke the truth. Even if I
could not see that there are no hairs, I could believe what she said, and so
consent to the surgery. Once the surgery is completed, and perception
delivers to me a world that accords completely with what she said, I come
to know directly that what I once merely knew inferentially, and, moreover,
what I knew only inferentially accords with what I now see to be the case
perceptually. By analogy, Tsongkhapa insists that ultimate truth is expressible; when we say or think things about it, we are in the position of the
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patient prior to surgery: correct, but not yet afﬁrmed in our correctness by
perception, knowing only discursively. Part of what we know about it is that
it is inexpressible, but we can know that conceptually; so, to say that it is
inexpressible is, paradoxically, to express something ultimately true.5
Grags pa bshad sgrub (1675–1748) in his commentary on Drang nges
legs bshads snying po (Essence of hermeneutics), The Essence of Eloquence:
A Presentation of the Two Truths in the Four Systems of Tenets (Grub mtha’
bzhi’i lugs kyi bden gnyis kyi rnam gzhag legs par bshad pa’i snying po)
(Grags pa bshad sgrub 2009), clariﬁes this point nicely:
We can distinguish between the categorized and the uncategorized ultimate in
terms of how they are expressed in language. The categorized ultimate is
twofold: the objective ultimate and the subjective ultimate. The ﬁrst is like the
emptiness of the sprout, which has an illusory appearance. The second is like
the authoritative inferential cognition that ascertains that emptiness. These two
are both called “ultimate,” but this is just a designation, and they are not actual
ultimates.
One can also distinguish between an objective and a subjective uncategorized ultimate in terms of how it is expressed in language. The ﬁrst is emptiness,
and so is the ultimate; it is just as it is: emptiness, the consummate, the absolute
truth, the same as the dharmadhatu. The second is the mental continuum of one
on the path of learning that directly realizes emptiness like the wisdom of
realization. This is said by some to be truly called the non-categorized ultimate,
but it is not. (Grags pa bshad sgrub 2009, p. 362)6

Grags pa bshad sgrub argues that there is no difference in object between
the categorized and non-categorized ultimate; rather it is in its mode of
appearance. It is emptiness in each case, although in the case of the
categorized ultimate, it appears in an illusory fashion. The uncategorized
ultimate is emptiness itself; the categorized is, on the object side, that
emptiness as it appears to a mundane subject, and on the subject side like
the premises and inferences by means of which we come to know it. The
consciousness of one directly apprehending emptiness is called an uncategorized ultimate by courtesy, but, he emphasizes, it is not the actual
ultimate, but only a mode of apprehension of it. It is, however, a mode free
from illusory appearance, and hence the appellation. In any case, the ﬁnal
goal of practice is not the realization of a new object of knowledge, but the
transformation of subjectivity, the transformation from inferential to direct
awareness, and from the apprehension of emptiness with an illusory
appearance to an apprehension without that appearance.7
We should note several important consequences of Tsongkhapa’s
account at this point, before considering the positions of his critics. First,
Tsongkhapa offers an account that explains the role of conception and
language in the process of realization. They are, on his account, more than
mere ladders to be cast aside. Language and thought can truly characterize
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ultimate reality, even if ultimate reality is characterized as uncharacterizable.
Setting aside his aversion to paradox, we note simply that he has the clarity
of mind to see that one cannot back away from true assertions about the
nature of reality, or undermine the accuracy of a position to which one
subscribes, on pain of undermining one’s own cogency and claim to
correctness. To deny the correctness of the Madhyamaka texts, in Tsongkhapa’s view, would be to give up not just on conceptuality, but also on the
fact that nonconceptual thought directly perceives the ultimate.
Second, as Grags pa bshad sgrub notes, Tsongkhapa draws the
distinction between the categorized and the uncategorized in terms of the
distinction between inference and perception. This distinction is marked
both in the pramān. avāda (epistemological) tradition of Dignāga and
Dharmakīrti, and in the more Madhyamaka-inﬂected epistemology of
Candrakīrti, both of which inform Geluk epistemology. But Tsongkhapa is
not simply following an Indian epistemological tradition; he is working out
how, on any understanding of epistemic warrant, we whose epistemic
activity is always conceptual can ever be warranted in our understanding of
an ultimate truth that cannot be conceptualized. This requires a cogent
understanding of a non-categorical mode of apprehension, an idea that may
seem mystical, but—although we will see that certain of Tsongkhapa’s
Tibetan critics take it in that direction—need not be.
Categorical apprehension concerning this view is simply inferential,
discursive apprehension, mediated by explicit judgment. Uncategorized
apprehension, then, is perceptual apprehension—spontaneous preconceptual engagement. Now, both Western philosophers since Kant and
Buddhist philosophers from Sautrāntika on argue that perception of the
phenomena we experience is always conceptually mediated; to perceive
is to perceive-as, and to perceive-as is to mobilize concepts. Nonetheless,
there is a clear difference between perception and inference, and
Tsongkhapa’s mobilization of Candrakīrti’s example makes that plain. To
perceive is to come to believe in what one perceives without thinking,
without inference (even in cases where one knows that one is deceived,
and does not believe that that in which one believes spontaneously is
actual. Inference begins with the data of perception, but then involves the
mediation of purely conceptual thought. Just being told that my eyes are
bad doesn’t get me to stop seeing the ﬂoaters, even though it gets me to
stop believing in them. By locating the uncategorized ultimate as akin to
perception as opposed to inference in that sense, Tsongkhapa ratchets
down the mystical understanding of the nonconceptual, reducing it to the
spontaneous, as opposed to the deliberate. The uncategorized ultimate,
then, is simply the ultimate seen spontaneously; the categorized is the
same ultimate understood conceptually, but not really seen—believedthat, but not believed-in.
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II. The Late Nyingma Critique
The Nyingma scholar Ju Mipham Rinpoche (1846–1912) takes a very different
position, more sharply distinguishing the categorized from the uncategorized
ultimate. In his view the categorized ultimate is ultimate in name only, a mere
simulacrum of the ultimate, referred to as ultimate only by analogy with the
genuine, uncategorized ultimate. In Speech of Delight he writes:
To begin with, it may be said that origination occurs at a conventional level,
within the domain of the words and thoughts of learning and reﬂection, but that
ultimately, there is no arising. When two modes are paired in this way, the
latter is the categorized ultimate. Because it is categorized in the correspondence with its partner, relative existence, and because it pertains to the category
of the ultimate, it is called categorized. This is what is categorized as the
partner to the relative when speaking of the two truths.
Since it is merely an entrance point that accords with the ﬁnal ultimate
truth, and since familiarization with this can overcome the apprehension of
entities that is due to the habitual tendencies that have solidiﬁed since the
beginning of time, it should be understood that this is the ultimate, and that this
is also a perspective from which the claim of no origination is positive. One
should know that even when having perfected the investigation into this, it is
no more than a way of having certainty during the ensuing attainment.
In terms of the ﬁnal abiding way of authenticity, the deduction of no
origination based on origination is mere mental other—exclusion, a mere
conceptual reﬂection. Beyond all extremes of origination, no origination, and so
forth, and leaving all objects of word and thought behind, the meaning
perceived by the stainless wakefulness of the meditative equipoise of the noble
ones is the unsurpassable uncategorized ultimate. From this perspective, no
claim whatsoever is made.
Since the categorized ultimate is near to and in accord with this, it belongs
to the category of the ultimate and is given the name the according ultimate.
(Mipham 2004, pp. 63–65)

Here Mipham urges that the categorized ultimate is a mere concept, not
reality. It is not placed on the subject side, as it is for Tsongkhapa, as a
distinct perspective on ultimate truth, but is rather an object—a conceptual
reﬂection, or a universal—that is called ultimate only by courtesy of its
proximity to the actual ultimate.8 It is not authentic. It is not a true
perspective on reality. He emphasizes the gulf between the categorized and
the uncategorized ultimate in Lion’s Roar:
The context such as the analysis whether the ultimate is within the domain of
mind or not refers to the uncategorized ultimate; the categorized ultimate is not
the expressed meaning because the categorized ultimate is in the context of a
novice progressively engaging in emptiness from merely a conceptual perspective. As such, it cannot roam in the territory of a mind like the nonconceptual
meditative wisdom of a sublime one, for which duality has subsided, like a
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beggar that has no power to sit on the universal Emperor’s throne. (Duckworth
2008, p. 31)

Duckworth comments:
The categorized ultimate concerns a perspective within a conceptual framework. In the content of discursive analysis, the categorized ultimate is known
within that framework, where there is no such framework demarcating the
uncategorized ultimate. In this way, Mipam portrays a provisional nature to
conceptual categories. (Duckworth 2008, pp. 31–32)

We can understand what drives Mipham in this direction. One can fairly ask
about ultimate truth: is it correctly captured by conceptual categories or not?
Is there a truthmaker for claims about ultimate truth or not? Whereas
Tsongkhapa unwillingly and unwittingly walks into paradox by answering
both “yes” and “no” to the ﬁrst, and embraces the unity of the two truths by
answering the second question in the afﬁrmative, Mipham dodges explicit
paradox by retreating to mysticism. He does so by answering a ﬂat “no” to
the ﬁrst, and divorces the ultimate from the conventional by answering the
second in the negative.
By taking the fact that the ultimate transcends all conception and expression
to mean that no conception or expression can possibly be true of the ultimate
(and therefore by denying that nonetheless that conception and expression is
true of it) Mipham must render the categorized ultimate entirely conventional,
and hence a different object from the uncategorized ultimate. It therefore is
entitled to the label merely by virtue of its similarity to, or utility in approaching,
the genuine ultimate. Since nothing can be said of the genuine ultimate, no
statement about it can be true, and so everything in the categorized ultimate is
simply false. The contrast with Tsongkhapa’s position is thus stark.
Bötrül (ca. 1900–1959) develops Mipham’s views further. In Distinguishing the Philosophies he writes:
The two ultimate valid cognitions are:
Those that analyze the categorized in the uncategorized.
The two conventional valid cognitions are:
Valid cognitions of conﬁned perception and purity.
The Lord Mipam elucidated these delineations
In accord with the quintessential instructions of the school of early translations
And the intended meaning of sutras, tantras, and sāstras,
In the elegant discourse, sword of insight.
The categorized valid cognition analyzing the ultimate
Establishes the temporary categorized ultimate;
The valid cognition that analyzes the uncategorized
Establishes the consummate uncategorized.
(Continued )
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. (Continued )
The conventional valid cognition of conﬁned perception
Establishes the mode of appearance—the impure relative;
The conventional valid cognition of purity
Establishes the mode of reality—the pure relative. (Bötrül, 2012 p. 34)

Here we see Bötrül distinguishing between the temporary categorized
ultimate and the consummate (yongs su grub pa).9 The objects themselves
are distinct, and the pramān. a that gives us access to the categorized gives
us no knowledge of the uncategorized:
Our tradition asserts that the categorized ultimate is
An emptiness that is a negation of constructed extremes only partially, and that
The uncategorized ultimate is
Free from all subtle and gross constructed extremes. (Bötrül, 2012 p. 39)

Here Bötrül explicitly distinguishes the categorized from the uncategorized
from the side of the object. The categorized is a kind of emptiness, but an
emptiness that is not free from all extremes: there are still things true and
false about it. The uncategorized is a different kind of emptiness, one of
which nothing can be said at all, and so free of all extremes:
Our tradition asserts that the uncategorized ultimate
Is free from all assertions.
Therefore the arguments of the great middle way
Are the great consequences. (Bötrül, 2012 p. 41)

At this point we should note the subtle but important difference between the
approaches of Tsongkhapa and his Geluk followers and Mipham and his
new Nyingma followers regarding this issue. As we noted, Tsongkhapa is
committed against his will to a contradiction, a paradox of expressibilty and
characterization that emerges at the limits of language, one that emerges
naturally in the Madhyamaka tradition. This does not render him irrational,
but perspicacious. And the paradox is explained by the fact that the
categorized and uncategorized ultimate are the same object taken from
distinct subjective standpoints.10 As a consequence, the transcendence of
the ultimate of conceptual thought does not preclude its being conceptualized. But for Mipham and Bötrül, the objective distinction between the
categorized and uncategorized ultimate means that its transcendence of
conception and expression is unmitigated by the paradoxical fact that we
can express that, and conceive of it as the inconceivable. All of that is sent
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over to the categorized side, and so is effectively denied. In attempting to
avoid paradox, they are thus forced into mysticism. We see this consequence in the following passage:
Our tradition asserts ultimate emptiness
As the great uncategorized ultimate,
The expense beyond the constructed phenomena
Of the relative objects found by a valid cognition of conﬁned perception.
Emptiness is not an entity;
While appearance is not reiﬁed,
That appearance abides as the great emptiness—
This is a critical point that destroys the clinging to entities.
Emptiness is not a nonentity;
While emptiness is not reiﬁed,
The self-lucidity of emptiness is appearing phenomena—
This is a critical point of the dawning of dependent arising.
Since it is not an entity, it is free from being a permanent entity;
Since it is not a nonentity, it is free from being the extreme of annihilation.
The expansive luminous clarity—profound, peaceful, and free from constructs
Is asserted as the great ultimate, the abiding reality.
This way is neither the domain of an analysis of the categorized ultimate nor
The domain of analysis of the conventional valid cognition of conﬁned perception.
The great valid cognition that analyzes the uncategorized ultimate
Is the unique meaning established by Prāsaṅgika reasoning. (Bötrül, 2012 p. 42)

Bötrul is explicit here about the radical disjuncture between the categorized
and uncategorized ultimate, and explicitly asserts that this disjuncture
represents the distinction not between two subjective modes of apprehension, but between two distinct objects of knowledge, only one of which—
the uncategorized—is real, and so a proper object of knowledge. The
difference is between a real nonentity and a non-real, but imagined, entity.
From the Geluk point of view—and, I might say, from the standpoint of
reason—this locates the ultimate outside the domain of objects of knowledge entirely. If the goal of practice is to come to know ultimate truth, this
is a disastrous consequence. Nonconceptuality may have been taken too far
if that which we are to attain is in principle unattainable.

III. What Do We Learn from This?
This is not the ﬁrst time I have argued that one of the virtues of
Madhyamaka philosophy, and of Tsongkhapa’s adumbration of Candrakīrti’s
interpretation of that system, is rationally paradoxical. By attending closely
to this debate about how to understand the distinction between the
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categorized and the uncategorized we see how important these paradoxes
are, and how rational. One might think that the embrace of paradox is the
ﬁrst step from rationality to mysticism. On the contrary (and Tsongkhapa
himself to the contrary notwithstanding), we discover that it is when one
attempts to save the ultimate from paradox by distinguishing objectively the
characterized from the non-characterized, and valorizing the non-characterized as the only genuine ultimate, that one slides into a position where the
most important thing to realize becomes unknowable, and where the
relationship between conventional and ultimate reality falls into mystery.
All Buddhist traditions struggle with the idea that conceptual thought is
shot through with fabrication and that it engages with unreal universals, and
with the idea that ultimate truth is beyond the reach of language and
conception. The struggle is made more poignant because Buddhist scholars
of all schools also work so hard to conceive and to describe just what that
inconceivable and indescribable ultimate is like, and to show why it is
inconceivable and indescribable. That task is necessary if there is to be any
real content to Buddhist metaphysics, epistemology, and soteriology. And
that task is further complicated by the thought that realization of the ultimate
can have no connection to ordinary life. The debate between Geluk and
Nyingma scholars in Tibet regarding how to reconcile these demands brings
these difﬁculties into sharp relief. I have argued that in this debate the Geluk
tradition probably has things just right. Nonconceptual awareness makes
perfect sense, so long as that of which one thereby becomes aware is also
conceptualizable.
Notes
Thanks to the members of the Berkeley workshop on conceptuality and
nonconceptuality, particularly John Dunne, who offered very helpful comments and corrections. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for very
helpful comments.
1 – We leave aside here the vexed question of just what it might be seen as.
2 – The Tibetan vocabulary is grounded in Bhāviveka’s distinction between
the apāryayaparamārtha and the pāryayaparamārtha introduced in
Tarkajvālā, but Tibetans are unanimous in urging that their distinctions
are not Bhāviveka’s, as that would run the risk of admitting that their
position is in fact a rang rgyud pa (svātantrika) position.
3 – ngo bog cig la ldog pa tha dad. Also see Cowherds 2012, Thakchöe
2007, and Garﬁeld 2015 for more on this issue.
4 – Remembering that this single object is apprehended by two very
different kinds of subjective cognitive states.
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5 – There is another issue lurking here, that of paradox in the ultimate. To
be fair, Tsongkhapa, because of his allegiance to Dharmakīrti’s logic,
never countenances the possibility of true contradictions. Nonetheless,
as a follower of Candrakīrti, he is certainly committed to paradoxes of
this kind, even if he does not acknowledge it. (See Garﬁeld and Priest
2003; Deguchi, Garﬁeld, and Priest 2013a; and Garﬁeld 2015.)
6 – sgras brjod rigs kyi sgo nas dbyed na/ rnam grangs pa’i don dam dang/
rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam bden pa gnyis/ dang po la/ mthun pa’i
yul dang yul can don dam bden pa gnyis/ dang po ni/ myu gu bden stong
sgyu ma bzhin du snang ba’i cha lta bu gnyis pa ni/ de rtogs pa’i rjes
dpag tshad ma lta bu ste/ ’di gnyis la don dam bden pa zhes btags pa
tsam ma gtogs/de dgnos ni min no// rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam
bden pa la yang sgras brjod tshul gyis dbye na/ yul don dam bden pa
dang/ yul can den dam bden pa gnyis/ dang po ni/ stong nyid lta bu ste/
don dam bden pa/ ji lta ba/ stong nyid/ yongs grub/ yang dag mtha’/ chos
dbyings rnams don gcig// nyis pa ni/ slob pa’i rgyud kyi stong pa nyid
mngon sum du rtogs pa’i ye shes lta by ste/ ’di rnam grangs ma yin pa’i
don dam dngos yin zhe ga cig bzhen kyang/ don dam dngos ni min no//.
7 – It is also worth noting the afﬁnities of Grags pa bshad grub’s views
with Yogācāra thought as articulated in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra
(seventh chapter) as well as in Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhās. ya (Treatise on
the discrimination between the middle and extremes), according to
which the consummate nature (parinis. panna/yongs su grub pa) is
regarded as the ultimate in contradistinction to the dependent nature
(paratantra/gzhan dbang)—which is also taken to be reality as it is—
because it is an object of puriﬁcation by observation, a foundation of
the so-called progressive model of the three natures.
8 – “Proximity” here denotes, as Mipham makes clear, not that the
categorized ultimate is even like the uncategorized, but rather the fact
that it is an “entrance point” in contemplation and meditation that
makes it possible to realize the uncategorized eventually.
9 – Again, note the Yogācāra language that intrudes when these topics are
under discussion. One should hesitate before drawing too bright a line
between the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka positions.
10 – Those familiar with debates about dialetheism in Madhyamaka might
at this point think that this distinction between two standpoints
amounts to a kind of parameterization, and hence a retreat from a
dialethic approach. One should resist this reading. Despite the fact that
the contradictory properties of the object become evident from two
distinct subjective perspectives, it does not follow that they are not two
contradictory properties of the common object. (See Deguchi, Garﬁeld,
and Priest 2013a.)
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